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INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This

case

presents

the

issue

of

whether

recovery

for

emotional injuries should be governed by the same fluid rule of
foreseeability which applies in tort cases generally, or whether
emotional injury cases should be singled out and governed by
some other, more mechanical, rule.

The defendants have not

disputed that the plaintiff's injuries are real and serious, and
the courts generally acknowledge that emotional injury can just

1

as or more debilitating than physical

injury.1

Defendants'

assertion that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover is
based instead on two primary arguments:
previously

stated

that

recovery

for

(1) This Court has
negligently

inflicted

emotional injury is not allowed, and should not reconsider that
decision, and (2) even if the Court were to allow recovery for
negligently

inflicted

emotional

distress

in some cases, the

Court should not do so in this case because plaintiff received
no impact, was not in the zone of danger, and was not a family
member of the decedent.
Plaintiff has adequately addressed the first argument in
his initial brief.

Each of the prior statements by this Court

concerning recovery for negligently inflicted emotional injury
must be considered dictum.

At best, the issue was a minor one

in each prior Utah case and not fully and adequately briefed or
considered.

More importantly, stare decisis, standing- alone, is

a very weak basis for decision.

While plaintiff would concur

that this Court should not abandon long-established precedents
without good cause, the Court should similarly not hesitate to
reexamine and overrule its decisions if warranted.
The

second

argument made by defendants, that plaintiff

should not recover under any rule of decision, is addressed
below.

The rules of decision announced by the various courts

have been grouped generally under three broad categories:

The

^ee, for example, the quotation from Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 365 S.E.2d 909, 916
(N.C. App. 1988), set forth on page 9 of this brief.
2

impact rule, the zone of danger rule and the foreseeability
rule.

Plaintiff has stated a cause of action under each of

these rules.
Complaint

With respect to the impact rule, plaintiff's

supports

the

inference,

or

in

the

alternative,

plaintiff should be granted leave to amend its Complaint to
clearly
from

state, that plaintiff suffered physical

the

emotional

distress,

including

consequences

sleeplessness

and

nightmares, with a result that he is not as physically active as
he might otherwise have been.

These allegations are sufficient

under the impact rule.
With respect to the zone of danger rule, Jesse Brown was in
the same elevator which killed his best friend.
had to be cut open to allow Jesse to escape.

The elevator

Jesse was clearly

within the zone of danger.
The foreseeability rule is really no rule at all, but an
acknowledgement that emotional injury cases should be governed
by the same rules of foreseeability as apply to tort cases
generally.

Defendants assert that even under the foreseeability

rule, plaintiff would be denied recovery because he was not a
close family member of the deceased.

The objective of the

courts which purport to require a close family relationship,
however, is simply to insure that a defendant be required to
compensate only injuries which were foreseeable.

It was clearly

foreseeable that Jesse would suffer serious emotional injury
from witnessing the death of his best friend.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FORESEEABILITY RULE SHOULD NOT BE
RIGIDLY LIMITED TO CERTAIN SPECIFIED RELATIONSHIPS.
The foreseeability rule is followed today by more states
than any single rule.

Defendants challenge the applicability of

the foreseeability rule on two grounds.

First, defendants claim

that many of the decisions cited in appellant's initial brief
were not bystander cases and should not be considered persuasive.

Second,

defendants

claim

that

the

foreseeability

"rule" limits recovery to close family members only.

These

claims are addressed in order:
Defendants

claim

that,

of

34

jurisdictions

listed

in

plaintifffs initial brief as following the foreseeability rule,
only 16 are bystander cases.

Defendants argue, apparently, that

rules of decision announced in non-bystander cases involving
emotional distress are not relevant to bystander cases.
entirely

misses

the

point.

The

benefit

and

This

advantage

of

expressing the rule in terms of foreseeability is the elimination of a special rule for bystander cases.
One of the cases which defendants apparently claim was not
a bystander case is Hunslev v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d
1096 (1976) .

Hunsley was sitting in her living room when her

neighbor drove her care into Hunsley's back porch utility room,
and sued to recover for the emotional injuries she suffered.
The trial court dismissed her complaint, and the Washington
4

Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed.

The court made a

thorough review of the various rules, and then stated:
It is apparent from a survey of this area of the
law that the application of the various rules, their
exceptions and aberrations, has led the courts to
reach absurd results and created numerous artificial
boundaries. Rather than add to the already existing
confusion with the formulation of a new rule, we
conclude that the wisest approach is to return to the
traditional principles, theories, and standards of
tort law.
Thus we test the plaintiff's negligence
claim against the established concepts of duty,
breach, proximate cause and damage or injury.

[W]e conclude that the plaintiff who suffers
mental distress has a cause of action; that is to say,
the defendant has a duty to avoid the negligent
infliction of mental distress.
It is not necessary
that there be any physical impact or the threat of an
immediate physical
invasion of the plaintiff's
personal security.
Our experience tells us that
mental distress is a fact of life.
With adequate
limitations,
the
courts
can
administer
the
adjudication of this tort just as it [sic] does the
complex intricacies of products liability and medical
malpractice.
553 P.2d at 1102-03 (citation omitted).
In any event, Jesse Brown in a very real sense was not a
bystander, but was a direct victim of the same negligence which
claimed the life of JoeDee Quinn.
years old, was trapped

Plaintiff, then only ten

in the same elevator.

It would be

reasonable for a jury to conclude that much of his emotional
injury was a direct result of being himself trapped inside an
elevator with an alarm button that did not function and controls
which did not work properly.

He experienced

a significant

period of panic before his frantic cries for help were answered.

5

Defendants' second challenge to the foreseeability rule is
the claim that non-family members are automatically
from its protection.

excluded

Such a mechanical approach defeats the

very purpose of adopting a foreseeability standard as opposed to
one of the other more mechanical

rules.

This was clearly

explained by the Supreme Court of Washington.

Addressing the

issue of the class of persons which may bring an action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court in Hunsley
v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), wisely stated:
We decline to draw an absolute boundary around
the class of persons whose peril may stimulate the
mental distress. This usually will be a jury question
bearing on the reasonable reaction to the event unless
the court can conclude as a matter of law that the
reaction was unreasonable.
553 P.2d at 1103 (citation omitted).

See also Wright v. Arcade

School District, 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812,
815 (1964)(foreseeability is question of fact).
That a ten year old boy will suffer severe emotional injury
from witnessing the death of his best friend, with whom he has
spent most of his waking hours, is certainly just as foreseeable
as it would be among family members who perhaps were not very
close or were even antagonistic.

Yet the construction of the

foreseeability rule advocated by defendants would deny recovery
in the one case while allowing it in the other.
mechanical

limitation

protection of the laws.

would

constitute

a

To adopt such a

denial

of

equal

To deny recovery to plaintiff without a

trial would be to hold that his emotional

injuries are not

serious (which at this stage of the action has not been dis6

puted) or that his injuries were not foreseeable.

Neither

proposition is correct.
Defendants also challenge certain of the states included in
plaintiff's listing of states which follow the foreseeability
rule.

Plaintiff acknowledges, after rereading the cases, that

some were cited in error, and apologizes for the error.2

Even

eliminating all such cases which were mis-cited or where the
rule of decision is unclear, however, the foreseeability rule
must still be characterized as the majority rule, followed by
more states than any other single rule.

Utah, once a leader in

the area of recovery for emotional injuries, remains as having
the most restrictive rule in the nation.
Defendants call attention to the fact that plaintiff cited
the case of Selsnick v. Horton, 96 Nev. 944, 620 P. 2d 1256
(1980), as being a case which applied the foreseeability rule.
Plaintiff

acknowledges

that

that

case

purports

to

require

intentional injury as a prerequisite for recovery for emotional
injury, and that the case was cited in error.

The proposition

for which the case was cited, however, is still correct.

In

State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985), the Nevada Supreme
Court stated that the issue of recovery of damages for emotional
distress caused by witnessing the death of another was an issue
of

first

impression

in Nevada, id. at 1374, and adopted a

2

A listing of the cases, indicating the rule of decision as
claimed by each party, is attached as Appendix "A" for the
Court's convenience.
7

Id. at 1376-79.3

foreseeability rule of liability.

Inexplic-

ably, the court in Eaton did not refer to the prior decision in
Selsnick.
The North Carolina case of Ledford v. Martin, 87 N.C. App.
88, 359 S.E.2d 505

(1987), review denied. 321 N.C. 473, 365

S.E.2d 1 (1988), does state that a physical injury is a prerequisite to bringing
state.

a claim

for emotional

injury

in that

A later North Carolina case, however, reveals that the

requirement of a physical injury is more illusory than real.
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 3 65
S.E.2d 909

(N.C. App. 1988).

Johnson also demonstrates the

artificial reasoning which courts find necessary when they have
adopted a rule different from the "foreseeability" rule applied
in most other areas of tort law.
Johnson involved a claim for medical malpractice brought by
the parents of a stillborn fetus.
doctors1

failure

to

properly

The parents alleged that the

treat

the

mother's

diabetic

condition caused their child to die of malnutrition.
parent claimed damages for emotional injuries.
little difficulty

finding

that the mother had

Each

The court had
suffered

the

requisite physical injury, but the father's claim required more

3

Although the plaintiff in Eaton had suffered a dislocated
ankle in the accident which claimed her daughter's life, the
emotional injuries complained of were not related to the injury
to the ankle. The court expressly criticized decisions which
purported to require a physical injury, but which allowed
recovery for emotional injuries not related to the physical
injury. Id. at 137 5.
8

inventive logic.

The court first noted that the distinction

between "physical" and "emotional" injury is nebulous at best:
As to the "physical injury" requirement for
negligently inflicted emotional distress, we first
note as a preliminary matter that a physical "injury"
is not required in North Carolina where "coincident in
time and place with the occurrence producing the
mental stress, some actual physical impact" is caused
to the plaintiff.
[Citation.] However, absent some
impact, the emotional distress claimant must manifest
some resulting physical injury. [Citation.] Furthermore, where the claim for emotional distress is
otherwise proper, our courts do not bar recovery
simply because strictly separating "physical" from
"mental" injuries is difficult:
[T]he general principles of the law of
torts support a right of action for physical
injuries resulting from either a willful or
a negligent act none the less strongly
because the physical injury consists of a
wrecked nervous system instead of wounded or
lacerated limbs, as those of the former
class are frequently much more painful and
enduring than those of the latter.
May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 422, 72
S.E. 1059, 1061 (1911); accord Stanback v. Stanback.
297 N.C. 181, 199 n. 1, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 n. 1
(1981).
Given the difficulty distinguishing "physical" from "mental" injuries, we also note numerous
courts have rejected requiring separate allegation or
even proof of a physical injury in connection with
negligently inflicted emotional distress. E.g., Saint
Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.
1987) ; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27
Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
365 S.E.2d at 916.
The court in Johnson noted other decisions which had found
the necessary physical injury where the distress resulted in
such symptoms as "nervousness, weight loss, confinement in bed
and other ailments."

365 S.E.2d at 918 (citation omitted).

The

court held that Mr. Johnson had adequately alleged the element
9

of physical injury, and reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint.
Defendants correctly point out that the court in Hatfield
v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest. 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944
(1980), did not adopt a foreseeability standard as claimed by
plaintiff in his initial brief, but rather continued to require
some physical manifestation of the emotional injury.4

Hatfield,

however, involved a claim for emotional injury resulting from a
breach of contract.

Subsequent Idaho decisions indicate that

Idaho has not yet adopted any rule of recovery for non-contract
cases.

In Brown v. Fritz. 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985),

the court reexamined

and affirmed the Hatfield

rule in the

contract context, but was careful to emphasize that its holding
was limited to contract cases.

699 P.2d at 1377.

Defendants also claim that to allow recovery in this case
would be to adopt a rule vastly more liberal than any other
state in the nation.
states

have

stated

Such is not the case.
that

a

close

family

Although several
relationship

will

normally be required, defendants did not cite, and plaintiff has
not discovered, any cases which actually deny recovery to a best
friend with a relationship as close as that in the instant case.

4

It is important to note that Idaho does not require that
there be a physical impact or contact, but only that the
emotional injury be sufficiently serious that its effects are
physically observable. Compare Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
of Central South Dakota, Inc.. 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987), where
the court, while not deciding which rule it would follow, held
that the requirement of physical impact was satisfied where the
only physical symptoms were nausea and diarrhea.
10

Furthermore, even if it would result in a more liberal rule,
this Court should decline to place artificial limits on the
right of recovery.

The facts in this case, where Jesse Brown

witnesses the painful and relatively slow death of his best
friend/ and where Jesse himself was a direct victim of the same
negligence, demand recovery.
The

injuries

suffered

by

plaintiff

were

foreseeable.

Plaintiff should be allowed to have a jury determine whether
those injuries were caused by the negligence of defendants.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER.
Defendants argue that plaintiff would not be allowed to
recover under the zone of danger rule because he was safely
located inside the elevator cage at the time that his friend was
killed.

It is true that with the benefit of hindsight, an adult

might conclude that plaintiff was not in any danger.

The zone

of danger cases do not, however, require that the plaintiff be
actually in danger.

In each case, hindsight demonstrated that

the danger was only perceived, not real, because the plaintiff
received no physical injury.
It must also be remembered that the zone of danger rule is
a substitute

for the foreseeability

areas of the tort law.

standard

found in other

The rule attempts to define that class

of persons which might reasonably be expected to have suffered a
serious emotional injury as a result of witnessing an injury to
another.

Plaintiff, a ten year old boy, certainly perceived
11

himself to be in danger.

In addition, had his friend been

successful in his experiment with the elevator, plaintiff would
in all probability have tried the same experiment.
Finally, that plaintiff was actually within the zone of
danger is evidenced by the fact that plaintiff was trapped in
the elevator.

His emotional injuries from the incident were a

result both of witnessing the death of his friend, and the
terror of his own imprisonment in the elevator cage.

Plaintiff

has stated a cause of action under the zone of danger rule.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED
A PHYSICAL INJURY WITHIN THE IMPACT RULE.
In

considering

the

sufficiency

of

the

allegations

of

plaintiff's Complaint on this motion to dismiss, all inferences
should be drawn in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

The

dismissal must be reversed unless this Court can "hold with
certainty that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the
claim.11

Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service,

Inc. , 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d
original).

605, 608

(1970) (emphasis in

The decree of specificity required was explained by

the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in the case of Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates, P.A*, 365 S.E.2d 909
(N.C. App. 1988).

One of this issues in that case was whether

the plaintiff's husband had suffered a physical impact as a

12

result of the defendant's negligence which allegedly killed his
unborn child.

The Court quoted from an earlier case as follows:

Although it is clear that plaintiff must show some
physical
injury
resulting
from
the
emotional
disturbance caused by defendant's alleged conduct,
given the broad interpretation of "physical injury" in
our case law, we think her allegation as she suffered
great mental anguish and anxiety is sufficient to
permit her to go to trial upon the question of whether
the great mental anguish and anxiety (which she
alleges) has caused physical injury.
365 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 187,
198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1981)).
The Court

in Johnson then continued to hold that "Mr.

Johnson's pleadings reveal no fact which would as a matter of
law prohibit him from later more specifically forecasting or
introducing that his alleged mental distress resulted in the
necessary physical injury."

365 S.E.2d at 918.

As set forth in plaintiff's initial brief, and in this
reply brief, the degree of physical injury necessary to support
a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional injury is
very slight, and amounts to only a requirement that there be
some objective evidence that an injury has been suffered.

The

existence of a physical manifestation can be inferred from the
facts alleged in plaintiff's Complaint.

In the alternative,

plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint to
allege the necessary physical impact.

See Moviecolor Ltd. v.

Eastman Kodak Co• , 288 F.2d 80, 88

(2d Cir. 1961) (court on

appeal has power to remand with instructions that trial court
entertain motion to amend).

13

CONCLUSION
Defendants do not dispute that Jesse Brown was emotionally
traumatized.

His injuries are real and will affect him more

severely and for much a longer time than many physical injuries
for which the courts would allow recovery.

No rational rule can

be set forth which would justify continuing to deny redress for
such claims.

This case should be remanded to the trial court

for trial.
DATED this 27th day of June, 1988.

JACKSON HOWARD,
FRED D. HOWARD, and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
27th day of June, 1988.
Mr. Ray Phillips Ivie
Attorney $t Law
IVIE & YOUNG
48 N. University
Avenue
Provo, UT 84601
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APPENDIX "A"
SUMMARY OF RULES BY STATE

Appellant
Claims

Respondent
Claims

Alabama:
Taylor v. Baptist Medical
Center. Inc., 400 So. 2d 369
(Ala. 1981)

foreseeability

not bystander

Alaska:

foreseeability

same

Arizona: Keck v. Jackson. 122 Ariz. 114,
593 P.2d 668 (1979)

zone of danger

same

Arkansas:
Midwest
Buslines.
Inc. v. Johnson. 291 Ark. 304, 724
S.W.2d 453 (1987)

impact rule

same

California:
Dillon v. Legg. 68 Cal. 2d
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d
912 (1968)

foreseeability

same

Colorado: Towns v. Anderson. 195 Colo.
517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978)

zone of danger

same

Connecticut:
Montinieri v. Southern
New England Telephone Co.. 175
Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Delaware: Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co.. 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709
(1965)

zone of danger

same

Florida:

foreseeability

non-bystander

Georgia: Hamilton v. Powell. Goldstein.
Frazer & Murphy. 252 Ga. 149,
311 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984)

impact rule

same

Hawaii: Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply
Ltd.. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673
(1975)

foreseeability

same

Idaho:

foreseeability

impact

Tommy's
Elbow
Room.
Inc. v. Kavorkian. 727 P.2d 1038
(Alaska 1986)

Champion v. Gray. 478 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1985)

Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons
Northwest. 100 Idaho 840, 606
P.2d 944 (1980)

Appellant
Claims

Illinois:

Rickey v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 98 111. 2d 546, 457
N.E.2d 1 (1983)

Respondent
Claims

zone of danger

same

Indiana: Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co.. 223 Ind. 425, 61
N.E. 2d 326 (1945)

impact rule

same

Iowa:

foreseeability

same

foreseeability

non-bystander

Kentucky: Deutsch v. Shein. 597 S.W.2d
141 (Ky. 1980)

impact rule

same

Louisiana:
Todd v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety
Co.. 219 So. 2d
538
(La. 1969); Mesa v. Burke. 506
So. 2d
121
(La. App.),
cert,
denied. 506 So.2d 1226 (La. 1987)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Maine:

Rowe v. Bennett. 514 A.2d 802
(Me. 1986)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Maryland: Vance v. Vance. 286 Md. 490,
408 A.2d 728 (1979)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Massachusetts: Dziokonski v. Babineau.
380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978)

foreseeability

same

Michigan: Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy
Health Corp.. 385 N.W.2d 732
(Mich App. 1986)

foreseeability

same

Minnesota: Stadler v. Cross. 295 N.W.2d
552 (Minn. 1980)

zone of danger

same

Mississippi:
First
National
Bank
v. Langlev. 314 So. 2d 324 (1975)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Missouri:
Bass v. Nooney
S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983)
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foreseeability

non-bystander

Montana: Versland v. Caron Transport.
671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1983)

foreseeability

same

Barnhill v. Davis. 300 N.W.2d 104
(Iowa 1981)

Kansas:

Hoard v. Shawnee Mission
Medical Center. 233 Kan. 267, 662
P.2d 1214 (1983)

Co..

Appellant
Claims

Respondent
Claims

Nebraska: James v. Lieb. 375 N.W.2d 109
(Neb. 1985)

foreseeability

same

Nevada:
Selsnick v. Horton. 620 P.2d
1256 (Nev. 1980) [cited by error;
proper cite is State v. Eaton. 710
P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985)]

foreseeability

no recovery

New York: Bovsun v. Sanperi. 61 N.Y.2d
219, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 461 N.E.2d
843 (1984)

zone of danger

same

New Hampshire: Corso v. Merrill. 406
A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979)

foreseeability

same

New Jersey: Portee v. Jaffee. 417 A.2d
521 ( N J . 1980)

foreseeability

same

New Mexico: Ramirez v. Armstrong. 100
N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983)

foreseeability

same

North Carolina: Ledford v. Martin. 359
S.E.2d 505 (N.C. App. 1987)

foreseeability

impact

North

Dakota:
Whetham v. Bismarck
Hospital.
197
N.W.2d
678
(N.D. 1972

zone of danger

same

Ohio:

Paugh v. Hanks. 451 N.E.2d 759
(Ohio 1983)

foreseeability

same

Oklahoma:
Ellington v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Tulsa. I n c . 717
P.2d 109 (Okla. 1982)

foreseeability

impact

Oregon:

impact rule

same

Pennsylvania:
Sinn v. Burd. 404 A.2d
672 (Pa. 1979)

foreseeability

same

Rhode Island: D'Ambra v. United States.
338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975)

foreseeability

same

South Carolina: Kinard v. Augusta Sash
& Door Co.. 336 S.E.2d 465
(S.C. 1985)

foreseeability

same

Saechao v. Matsakoun. 78
Or. App. 340,
717
P.2d
165,
review dismissed. 302 Or. 155,
727 P.2d 126 (1986)

Appellant
Claims

South

Dakota:
Wright v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Central South
Dakota, Inc.. 414 N.W.2d 608
(S.D. 1987)

Respondent
Claims

foreseeability

impact

Tennessee:
Shelton v. Russell Pipe &
Foundry Co.. 570 S.W.2d 861
(Tenn. 1978)

zone of danger

same

Texas: St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard,
730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Vermont: Vaillancourt v. Medical Center
Hospital of Vermont, Inc.. 139
Ut. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).

zone of danger

same

Virginia: Hughes v. Moore. 197 S.E.2d
214 (Va. 1973)

foreseeability

impact

Washington:
Hunslev v. Girard. 87
Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096
(1976)

foreseeability

non-bystander

Washington, D.C.: Waldon v. Covington.
415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. App. 1980).

impact rule

same

West Virginia: Harless v. First National
Bank in Fairmont. 289 S.E.2d 692
(W. Va. 1982)

foreseeability

impact

Wisconsin:
Garrett v. City of New
Berlin. 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362
N.W.2d 137 (1985).

zone of danger

same

Wyoming: Gates v. Richardson. 719 P.2d
193 (Wyo. 1986).

foreseeability

same

